A new approach to labor law by Creek, Robert
A NE, APPROACH TO IBOR LAW
Robert Creek
Department of
Business & Engineering Administration
1947
:Iii
I
-r-.
·::
;i
!;
- . .
THESIS AUTHORIZATION
Date _Marc.h 2%. 1d7 
Name Robert N. Creek .
.Topic Possibilities of a Uniform Labor Statute
This is your authority to proceed with the thesis
investigation as outlined in your preliminary report.
Please return this sheet with the original copy of the
finished thesis..
Adviser Prof'..A A. Schaefer Room 1-180
SIgnature1o .he.Ad.iser, ii i compLet .on.of.a
Signature of the Adviser, indicating completion of a
satisfactory preliminary report.
. .
) Adviser -
Date , z
Signa.ture of the Supervisor, indicating proper
registration for credit, and generally satisfactory progress;
Supervisor
-
-
- -- -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
_
II
-
Professor George W. Swett
Secretary of the Faculty
assachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts
Dear Sir:
In accordance with the requirements for grad-
uation, I submit a thesis entitled "A New Approach to
Labor Ilw."
Siicerely yours,
Robert N. Creek
1PREFACE
This is an attempt to appraise the present-
day labor policies and law and to present suggestions
for modifications and changes that will be for the good
of all parties--particularly the consumer.
The Introduction is an- attempt at explaining
the author's general position. Part I is a brief summary
of the history which leads up to present-day policies and
also an attempt to define the government's policies.
Part II deals with the inadequacies and complexities which
can be found in the law. Part III proposes to set up
machinery that will effectively handle all labor troubles,
and Part IV is composed of specific recommendations for
legislative action.
2INTRODUCTION
During the last fifteen years, public opinion
with respect to labor has fluctuated widely. Before the
great depression, neither the public nor government mani-
fested much concern over the weakened bargaining position
of labor. But in the Thirties, the Federal Government,
supported by public opinion, undertook to promote the ex-
tension of unionism throughout the economy, to broaden the
scope of collective agreements, and in every way possible
to increase the power of labor organizations in the bar-
gaining process.1
We are today faced with the inescapable problem
of labor strife, the battle between labor and capital.
It has become so wide a problem with so many ramifications
that it comes into each and every home, by newspaper and
radio propaganda, by direct contact with one or the other
of the parties; and inevitably by our position as consumers.
Many people will draw their views upon the sub-
ject according as they are lined up with labor or capital;
many more will align themselves with the pro-labor forces
or management because of sympathies that spring from their
work and education. But everyone is dravn into the conflict,
unwillingly and unknowingly, perhaps, as a consumer.
1. Metz and Jacobstein, A National Labor Policy, Brookings
Institute, -1-'ashington, 1947; quoted from the preface.
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Labor costs are generally direct costs of a pro-
duct and as such are reflected in the selling price of the
item. If wages go up, prices must go up, unless manage-
ment has been making abnormally large profits or operating
at poor efficiency. There is a wide divergence of opinion
on this economic theoryl; nevertheless, it is the one that
is taken here. To argue this single point would take
volumes.
It is an almost impossible thing to remain
"neutral" when examining such a controversial subject as
labor law; one is inevitably led to become pro-this or anti-
that. In this case the closest thing to a neutral position
with respect to labor and capital is to be "pro-consumer."
That will be the attitude taken in this thesis.
Labor Unions
With the passage and subsequent successful con-
stitutional testing2 of the Wagner Act in 1935, we have
expressly given toleration to an institution directly at
odds with what many have traditionally cherished as the
American way--namely, free competition and enterprise.
Labor unions are candidly monopolistic organizations and
are anti-competitive in almost all cases. Still labor
1. Unions must "debunk the stupid economic theory that you
cannot raise wages unless you get a comparable price in-
crease. The whole history of American industry belies
this contention." Walter Reuther in a speech at Atlantic
City, November, 1946.
2. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v IRB, 301 U.S. 1
4unions must appear to all except the most prejediced as
valuable and necessary institutions in our industrial
society. They are, as Justice Holmes points out, necessary
to obtain that equality of bargaining power in which real
liberty of contract begins. For years, however, many em-
ployers defeated efforts of their workers to organize by
discharging union leaders, by black lists, by forcing work-
ers to sign yellow dog contracts, by setting up company
unions, and the like. To make collective bargaining possible
to all, the "Taner Act was passed.
As a practical matter then, wTe have committed our-
selves to toleration within our midst of a monopolistic
force w:ielding tremendous economic power. This does not
mean, however, that we are helpless in dealing with this
force or subjecting it to those restrictions considered
necessary for the good of all. 7¥ith management the re-
strictions on unfettered power came fifty years ago with
the She:rman Act. Recent indications that the public thinks
that unions, too, must be limited in their activity have
been seen in the Ball-Burton-Hatch Bill and the Taft-
Hartley Act.
The Strike
No one can now deny the union of the use of its
most potent weapon--the right to strike. It is not only
politically impossible, but socially dangerous, to try to
completely abolish the strike. Yet Congress has tried to
5prevent strikes on interstate carriersl by providing what
almost amounts to compulsory arbitration. As a result of
the disasterous coal strikes in November 1946, many people
called for this same sort of arrangement to be applied to
certain industries.
The right to strike is necessary for labor to
accomplish its legitimate objectives, generally regarded.:
as higher wages, shorter hours, and better working condi-
tions. But just as most rights are limited by the rights
of others, is it not reasonable to suppose that there are
times when the right to concerted action should be limited?
How far these limitations should go, we will attempt to
find out.
A Labor Law
There are many who argue that legislation and
laws will effect no cure upon the present labor strife2;
they would argue that all turmoil will disappear when
labor and capital cease to regard one another as enemies
and join in a common goal of more production with less
effort. However this is not the case at the present time--
all is not in "apple pie order." To argue that we need no
murder laws since very few people would commit murder is
1. Railway Labor Act of 1926, amended 1934, US;CA 151 et seq.
2. The President of the United States among them.
6obviously unsound; so long as we have even a few potential or
actual trouble makers on the labor scene, we will need a law
to protect the majority. If in time, the need for such a law
disappears, the law itself will,also fade away.
In the effort to determine just what should com-
promise a labor law we look to the ideas which seem to have
developed in the administration of justice from as far back
as the time of Demosthenes. Some responsibility for our
conduct is a minimum requirement for social life in our
world; considerations should be given interests which should
be free from interference (such as health, etc.); a law
should deal in a consistent way with the conflicting desires
which create disputes and law suits; yet circumstances must
always be taken into account. These ideas have been bred
into us so deeply that we are perhaps normally unaware of
their existence, but let one of them be endangered and we
very quickly awaken to the danger.
Keeping within the bounds of our cherished ideas
of law, we still wish to see industrial strife ended, or at
least reduced to a minimum. From a layman's point of view,
a law should be stable, intelligible, on record for public
reference, and designed for the greatest good of the greatest
1. This is an extremely brief summfnry of 22 pages from
Sharp & Gregory, Social Change and Labor Law, University
of Chicago Press, 1939, 1-22.
7number. Of necessity it should be capable of easy enforce-
ment in principle and letter.
"Te are looking, then, for a means of solving the
many labor problems that confront us, solving them with
dispatch and with no hard feelings.
8PART I
A history showing the development
of present-day labor policies.
i. Brief History of American Labor Law
Before attempting to evaluate the present-day labor
law, it is first necessary to consider the development and
origins of the Federal labor policy. Changing economic forces
have brought about entirely new concepts within the past one
hundred years. The major events in the evolution of these new
concepts will be traced in this section.
Early English Law
The three cases often called the "House of Lords
TrilogyT"l established the English concept of labor unions
at the turn of the century; namely, that intentionally in-
flicted harm is actionable unless justified, the justifi-
cation depending 1,rgely upon the judge's social and econcrnic
predilections. The judges were quite opoosed to labor, s elf-
help and developed the "criminal conspiracy" doctrine. Only
through judicious use of their ever growing political power
did the British trade unions develop their programs. So
careful has been this use that until quite recently the
British labor scene has been relatively quiet.2 It was
only natural that the early concepts of English law would be
carried to America.
1. Mongul Steamship Co. v McGregor, 23 QBD 598; Allen v Flood,
(1898) A.C. 1 (H.L.); and Quin v Leathem, (1901) A.C. 495 (H.L.Ir.)
2. Sharp & Gregory, Social Change and Labor Law, University of
Chicago Press, 19-9, p94.
C.: ,  -,,2
Ad
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Early American Law
In 1806, in the first American labor law case, the
judge adopted the criminal conspiracy doctrine without reser-
vation.1 However, the history of this doctrine was quite
brief in America. In 1836, the conviction of twenty ourney-
men tailors in New York in the case of People v Fisher
resulted in demonstrations by mobs and hangings of judges in
effigy, The udiciary began to see that some new concept was
needed.
In 1842, the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court dealt this doctrine a resounding blow which all
but exterminated the idea of criminal conspiracy. In Common-
wealth v Hunt2, a milestone in U. S. labor law, Chief Justice
Shaw made the end of the strike the thing to be tested. In
this case, a strike for making certain non-union employees
join the tuion, the end was held to be legitimate. Indirectly,
the use of self-help tactics was approved.
Unions were quick to use this new found help and
began organizing on a large scale. A strike could make an
employer come to terms before the long, drawn out processes
of a criminal prosecution could be completed; thus the
employer began to look for a new weapon.
1. Philadelphia Cordwainerst Case, Commons & Gilmore, Doc. Hist.
Amer. Soc. (1910), III, 59-248
2. 4 Metc. III (Mass. 1842)
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The Injunction
The American bar met this seeming crisis with the
most powerful weapon in the history of labor disputes--the
labor injunction and restraining order. During the heyday of
the injunction, roughly from 1880-1932, the Judiciary was
overwhelmingly lined up on the side of business. Most of
the time, the question seemed to be the legality of the
collective bargaining practices. Union pressure upon the
political scene made some stir but produced no results.
"We especially object to government by injunction as a new
and highly dangerous form of oppression by which Federal
judges, in contempt of the laws of States and rights of
citizens, become at once legislators, judges and execution-
ers. ,1
Judges used no juries, and issued injunctions
ex parte, because it was felt that speed was the real test.
Even if a union was in the right, there was no sense in risk-
ing great damage to the company. If the unions were proved
wrong in a criminal proceeding#, "the remedy at law would be
inadequate." So, strikes must be prevented.
Industrial Conflicts
It was said that labor unions should abandon coer-
cive practices in favor of orderly recourse at the polls.
1. Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1896
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But labor must first organize before it can present united
policies to be voted upon. The biggest struggle was the up-
hill climb to organization. The strike had become a familiar
phenomenon in our history ever since the 1790's; but prior
to the Civil War, strikes had been- oealized and-, on the
whole, peaceful. "The Great Strike of 77" was the first
great outburst, the first large-scale battle between labor
and capital. Others followed: the Pullman Strike in '94,
the Haymarket Riots, the Homestead battles in '92; the out-
breaks in the coal fields of Pennsylvania in '02; and many
others. The Pullman strike put the Federal government in di-
rect opposition with labor. Wfrarfare has ever been continuous
on the labor scene; thirty-eight thousand strikes between 1881
and 1906; twenty-six thousand between 1916 and 1935.1
Legislation and the Courts
If the warfare was continuous, so were the attempts
at peace.. Both labor and capital showed that they were anxious
for peace,. Employer "paternalistic" approaches dominated one
side of the scene, while labor placed its reliance upon collec-
tive bargaining and self-help tactics. The government, Congress,
approached the problem with various legislative acts.
1. Quoted from Morrison and Commager, The Growth of the American
Republic, Oxford University Press, New York, 1942, II, 166.
The description of the American labor movement in Chapter
VII is much more detailed than this brief outline.
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The Erdman Act of 1898 which provided for the
arbitration of labor disputes on interstate carriers was de-
clared unconstitutional as an abbrogation of the freedom of
contract.1 In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act which,
though it aroused the fears of labor leaders, was thought by
the authors not to affect labor. The suspicions of the labor
leaders were soon confirmed in the famed Danbury Hatters'
case.2 The Clayton Anti-trust Act of 1914 contained a special
clause3 forbidding the use of the injunction in labor disputes,
except "t'1o prevent irreparable injury," but a series of court
decisions, especially the Duplex Cape, nullified this pro-
vision.
By now it is seen that the government was attempting
to take control of labor disputes, and that the courts were try-
ing equally as hard to preserve their control over the labor
scene. In 1932, an effective act was passed, the Norris-LaGuar-
dia "Anti-injunction" Act, which prevented the federal courts
from issuing injunctions in labor disputes, did away with the
legality of the "yellow-dog" contracts, and attempted to de-
fine the term "labor dispute." This was the first federal
declaration of the federal policy with respect to collective
bargaining--labor was to be free from interference, restraint,
1. Adair v U.S. 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
2. Loewe v Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274. This and the ensuing cases
are discussed again, infra, Part II
.. Rect ion 20
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or coercion. . .for the purposes of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.1
Federal Intervention
The Sherman and Clayton Acts were not designed
exclusively as labor legislation; the Norris-LaGuardia Act
was. But even before this there were other federal attempts
to handle labor problems. The Erdman Act of 1898 has already
been mentioned. Labor's first real experience with federal
intervention came in the First World War. At the request of
President Wilson, representatives of the AFL met with employers
in a labor conference at which was formulated a set of principles
to be used as a guide during the war emergency. The basic ideas
agreed to by both parties were that labor would not strike,
and in return that employers would not try to fight labor or-
ganization moves; and they would not discriminate against
union members. The National War Labor Board ras to administer
the program, and consisted of five labor members, two mem-
bers to represent the public, and five members from manage-
ment.
After the war came the depression of 1920-21 in
which large scale unemployment came in; and by 1923 union mem-
bership had dropped 30 per cent. Management became anti-
union, but at the same time tried to improve the worker's con-
ditions. This was the era of the "company union." Once again
1. 29 U.S.C.A. Section 102.
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there were fights for organization.
The first important move in the direction of federal
protection of the right to organize came with the enactment of
the Railway Labor Act of 1926. (From the point of view of labor,
this act was strengthened by amendments adopted in 1934.) The
government had returned the railroads to private ovnership in
1920; Congress simultaneously created the Railway Labor Board
which was purely advisory--it had no power to enforce anything.
This Board was in effect ignored, and a drastic strike in the
industry rose after the wage cuts necessitated by the depres-
sion of '21. It was for the purpose of preventing strikes and
avoiding interruption of railway service that the railways and
the unions jointly appealed to Congress to enact the Railway
Labor Act of 1926.
This Act created a Board which was to seek peaceful
settlement of disputes wherever possible by voluntary arbit-
ration. In case of trouble, the Board could appeal to the
President who was then to appoint a fact-finding commission.
This law iposes upon both railroads and unions the obligation
to make every sincere effort to enter into and maintain collec-
tive bargaining agreements.
The second major stop in the development of the policy
of federal intervention came with the passage of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act which has been discussed previously. Besides relating
to the injunction and the yellow-dog contract, it is significant
in that it contained the first declaration of a congressional
16
labor policy with respect to collective bargaining for all
cases coming within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
It wasn't long before Congress would try to extend this policy
over the entire national labor picture.
The Government Guarantees the Rihts of Labor
The long and disasterous depression which began in
1929 caused organized labor for the first time to appeal to
Congress for aid in the fixing of hours and wages; in the
emergency, self-help had proven of little value. W3hereas Con-
gress did not enact the proposed thirty-hour week, a plan for
the general recovery of the nation was passed, the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, better known as the NRA.
Even though this act was declared unconstitutional,l it con-
tained the labor provision which was to become the basis of
the W7agner Act, the famous section 7 (a). It was provided
that employees should have the right to organize, bargain
collectively, choose their. own representatives, that they
should be free from employer restraint, interference, or coer-
cion, free from discriminatory practices, and free to freely
choose whichever union, if any, they wanted.
W.hen the NRA was held invalid, organized labor
abandoned their traditional policy of self-help and sought
enactment of a law which would embody the provisions of
1. Schechter Corp. v U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
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section 7 (a). This goal was accomplished on July 5, 1935,
by the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, better
known as the 'Wagner Act, "Labor's Basic Charter."
The expressed policy of the W.agner Act is based on
two \considerations: one, that by strengthening the bargaining
power of labor the free flow of commerce would be facilitated;
and, two, that the national economic welfare would be helped
by the increased ability of labor to secure a larger share of
the national income.
The 7Tagner Act extends to all industries which can
be classed as engaged in interstate commerce, and also pro-
vides enforcement provisions. It spells out in considerable
detail (in section 8) what would be considered unfair labor
practices on the part of the employer. It can enforce its
decrees by appeal to the Circuit courts; and,, if an employer
then refuses to follow its orders, he stands in contempt of
court.
One of the primary functions of the NLRB is to
designate proper representatives and bargaining units. The
administration of this function as had considerable influence
in the selection of the bargaining representatives in plants
and industries.1
1. The rules and methods used in determining these bargaining
units will be found in NLRB, Third Annual Report (1939),
157-190 and in the succeeding annual reports.
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The Wagner Act was frankly designed for the ex-
clusive benefit of labor; the employer had too long held the
upper hand over his employees. There was no such thing as
an unfair labor practice by labor within the meaning of the
act., Even though this act is designed to encourage and
promote collective bargaining, the obligation to bargain
collectively is not imposed on labor, but is a "must" for the
employer . 1
TfWorld ar II
Since the NLRB had no authority to deal with labor
disputes, many new ideas were tried and new machinery set up.
The object of all was, of course, the furtherment of the war
effort tbroughthe maximum efficiency of labor--i.e., no
strikes. First came the Office of Production Management with
Mr. Knudsen and r. Hillman representing management and labor
respectively. Then there was created a National Defense
Mediation Board, which broke down on the question of the
closed shop when the CIO withdrew from the Board.
Then the National War Labor Board was created by
executive order. Congress soon after enacted the WSar Labor
Disputes Act which prohibited the encouragement, etc, to
strike in government operated plants. The War Labor Board,
under Mr. W Tirtz, was deluged with cases that arose under the
1. The history here presented has been taken largely from
two sources; Mforison and Commager, p Cit; and Metz,
The Labor Policy of the Federal Government, The Brookings
Institut ion,. Tashngon, 194 .
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provision of the thirty days eoling-off period in all in-
dustry provided by this Act. The outstanding defect of the
YIEqPas been said to be that it had no body of principles
on which to base its decisions. By November, 1946, all con-
trols were lifted off labor with the exception of the exist-
ence of a National Labor Relations Board which was from many
sides declared to be outmoded.
The Taft-Hartley Act.
"The Taft-Hartley Act is on the books today because
no free people can tolerate any great and powerful group, as
labor unions are today, being above and beyond the law. Prior
to June 23, 19471, there were federal laws governing employers
in labor relations. but virtually none governing the conduct
of unions. The power which this situation gave to the lead-
ers of the big unions was tremendous. Small employers and
individual:rworkers were at their mercy. They had to go along
with patterns set by a few union leaders in negotiations with
a few great corporations."2
Thus we can see the picture of labor law as a great
pendulum. when it became evident that labor was completely
at the :mercy of capital the pressure of public opinion and
congressional action swung the pendulum far over to labor's
side. Gradually this pendulum has swung back, quite rapidly
within the last few months, to a position where m a na g em e n t i s
1. The day of the Taft-Hartley Act was passed
~:~:~ 2. The Honorable Joseph Ball in an address from Washington,
Tulv 10.- 1947
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recognized to have been harmed by labor. During these swings
a great body of laws has been built up; some doctrines have
appeared and have been short lived, others have prospered.
From the brief history presented here, the essence of what is
today our national labor policy can be drawn.
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II. The Federal Labor Policy and Law
Since the enactment of the 'Vagner Act the federal
government has sought to enable employees to gain higher wages
and shorter hours of work by increasing the bargaining power
of labor. It has attempted to promote the peaceful solution
of labor difficulti-es, and has given the employees the right
to organize in their own way. Naturally there have been
clashes between these objectives. One objective has prevailed
over the other two--bargaining power has been preserved at
all costs.
Concerted Action
The federal government sought by increasing bargain-
ing power and promoting concerted action to raise the wages
and lower the working hours of the American workingman.. Efforts
have been made to protect the employee in the use of various
forms of' concerted action:- the organization of unions, the
right t strikel, picket and boycott. Not only have employees
been given the right to organize, but they are actually en-
couraged by the government to exercise that right on the pre-
mise that an increase in union membership will result in
increased union bargaining power. At present, the right to
strike is almost unlimited (again, excepting the Taft-Hartley
Act as umtried). In a number of ways the government has made
it hard for the employer to operate his plant while his
employees are on strike.
1. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike."
Section 13, National Labor Relations Act.
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Few limitations have been placed upon the workers'
use of the various forms of conxerted action. Even though
interstate commerce is affected-and restricted, these various
self-help methods are condoned.
The ultimate end of concerted action by unions is
supposedly the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement.
It is, however, almost impossible for an employer to enforce
the provisions of an agreement and recover damages as a result
of breach of contract. Even though a union agrees not to
picket, strike, or anything else, it can without any trouble
do just what it has contracted not .-to, do-. One of the reasons
an employer enters into an agreement with a union is to free
his establishment from the losses incurred by union activity.
.Many employers see little to be gained from a collective agree-
ment if there is no way of enforcing its provisions,
Self-Organization
The second of the three fundamental objectives of
the federal government is the worker's right to self-organ-
ization. In order to help this along as much as possible,
the employer is forbidden to do or say anything that would
even indirectly interfere with this right. The National Labor
Relations Board is set up to do further this aim, to protect
the eployees in their self-organization.
The Federal Government helps this as much as
possible. It even picks the proper bargaining units in an
industry or a company and regulates the eleeationfor the proper
representatives. This is necessary, for if the employer is
.
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-to know with what unit he is to b argain, somebody must select
this unit; who else but the government. But in a sense this
contradicts the right of self-organization; the selection of
the bargaining unit is oftentimes tantamount to the selection
of the representatives.1
Peaceful Solution of Labor Difficulties
Concerted action and Self-organization have been
encouraged because it was felt that through these two means,
there would be a substantial cessation of labor hostilities.
Various tpes of governmental machinery has been at one time
or another set up to mediate, investigate, and arbitrate in-
dustria:l disputes. .But in almost all cases where such machin-
ery has existed, the employees have had a free choice as to
whether or not they would use the facilities. They could at
any time resort to stoppages of work in order to gain their
demands. In almost no case, has the workers' rights to strike
been limited or regulated (with the possible exception of
wartimes measures._)2
As actually applied these three objectives frequently
conflict. 7Then the desire of the government to increase the
bargaining power of employees has clashed with its efforts to
secure peaceful settlement of labor disputes, practically
always the objective of increasing the bargaining power of
1. Somewhat similar to the old practice of gerrymandering.
2. But the NLRB was beginning to come around to the idea that
some strikes were illegal, and the Supreme Court held that
in effect the "sit-down" strike was illegal in NIRB v
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. 306 U.S. 240
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laborers has prevailed over all other considerations. It is
felt by many that bargaining power has now given away to
"bludgeoning power." Almost always the party threatening to
peace
break the industrial/has a definite advantage, because any
conciliating agency tends to feel that peace at any price is
better than strife. In almost all cases the workers are the
ones who are threatening to break the peace and they are thus
in the most advantageous position.
Recently, the opposition to these policies scored
a victory, the extend of Which is still to be seen, in the
passage-.-over presidential veto--of the Taft-Hartley Act.
It is clearly obvious that it is time to re-examine these
views and policies and the labor law in general with an eye
to possible modifications and amendments.
25
PART II
Showing the complexities
and inadequacies of our
present labor law.
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I. Complexities in the Law
Constitutional Problems
Partly because of the limitations put upon Congress
by the Federal Constitution , the labor relations policy of
the national government is embodied in many acts which were
made at many different times. "then a policy is embodied in
many laws. the only result is that inconsistencies develop
in interpretations and in the laws themselves.
One of the major causes for the lack of a uniform
federal policy toward labor is the Constitution. The problem
of a labor policy has always been attacked by round-about ways
and necessarily so. This is due to two factors; first, only
certain powers have been given to the federal government; and
secondly, the formnof our government has complicated matters
even more. These two reasons are perhaps one and the same,
but a separation helps clarify the problems a little bit.
Nowhere in the Constitution can be found authority
for the federal legislature to regulate labor relations,
nor is this authority denied the states. According to the Tenth
Amendment, this would mean that the power to regulate labor
would belong to the states. As a consequence, the federal
government can act in this' field only within limits of its
other powers. As a result the national labor policy has been
expressed somewhat indirectly. The Sherman nti-Trust Act
and the Railway Labor Act are ustified as applied to labor
only by the poiters of the federal government to regulate
2 7
commerce. The orris-LaGuardia Act is justified only under
the powers of Congress to control the urisdiction and pro-
cedures o the Federal Courts. The federal courts have
from time to time expressed themselves on the legalities of
various self-help devices used by unions. This is only
because the courts have the jurisdiction over cases involving
Constitutionality of state laws and of cases in which the
parties involved are citizens of more than one state. The.
,, Wagner Act was passed under the guise of regulating inter-
state commerce.
There is nothing in the world to prevent a Supreme
Courtsomeday to 'undo all that the Congress has done in this
field by saying that they no longer think that these acts are
legitimate regulations of interstate commerce.
The position of the supreme court as to the
boundaries of inter-state commerce has varied as the swing of
e pendulum; "Commerce," it said in an early case, "omprehends.
every species of commercial intercourse.;" while later on the
court became more restrictive as to the bounds within which
'the Congress could act. The NIRA was held unconstitutional
as regulating transactions not directly affecting interstate
commereel; a few years later the court began to broaden the
scope of the concept again, until today. it is hard to find
cases which are not somehow tied to interstate commerce.2
'1. Schecter Corp v TU.S. 295 U.S. 495
2. A wealth of cases illustrating this point may be found on
page 395, Handler, Cases on'Labor Law, WIest Publishing Co.St. Paul, Minn.
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lava, If the pendulum swings back to the restrictive position once
more, as i could easily do, gone would be all attempts at a
national labor olicy.
The form of government of the country also poses
difficulties in formulating a unified labor policy. The
Wagner Act protects the worker's rights to join a union, but
the legality of those unions rest in the authority of states.
Employers under the national law must bargain collectively,
but the legal status of the agreements reached is determined
by state law. Federal lav makes it legal for a trade union
and an employer to enter a closed shop agreement, but a state
law may make it illegal.
Conflicting Jurisdictions
We have in our governmental system forty-eight states,
one federal district, and a federal government (not to men-
tion territories) in all of which there are many labor problems.
Each state has its own labor laws, and is, at the same time,
subject to the federal authority. Many of these state laws
are in complete disagreement. By way of example, consider the
closed shop. Until the LA 1 it was considered a legitimate
object of a strike by the federal government; prior to 1947
it was illegal in five states (Ariz., S.D., Neb., Ark., and
FLA.); and as of March 1947. it was illegal in seven more
(Tex., Tenn., N.C., N.D., Va., Ga., and N. Mex.) and legislation
1. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act
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was pending in six others while anti-closed shop moves had
been turned down in. four states (Id., Colo., W. a, and Myo.)
That this sort of thing leads to incredible confusion is clear
to all. How to sue a union was answered in almost forty-eight
different ways in the various states. The federal courts have
,~::. from time to time found it necessary to agree or disagree with
various state laws relating to labor practices. It said "Yes"
to W.isconsin1 and "No" to Arizona 2
Labor Law may be said to be the traffic controls
on union-management conduct. If the rules and signs change
from state to state, there isn't much chance for the driver
to remain unconfused.
Someone may argue that this criticism is lacking
in force because many of our laws are almost hopelessly snarled.
Look at the divorce laws, the traffic laws, etc., etc. Be-
cause these laws are confused and are snarled is no argument
that they are right. There have been many moves, unfortunately
unsuccessful, to consolidate these laws into one federal code
or at least a uniform law.
Until the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act there
were no restraints upon the unions--no union unfair labor
'A~.' practices in the federal policy. But there were many states
1. Senn v Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468. Up-
holding Constitutionality of statute Which allowed pick-
Pt" -eting.
;~!:'t 2. Truax v Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 Declares Arizona Sup. Ct.'sdecision in interpreting Arizona anti-injunction statute
invalid.
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.which had put certain restrictions upon the employees, Wis-
consin's Little WTagner Act did so, and the Barnes Bill in
Massachusetts also tried to take steps toward the regulation
of unions.1
Court Decisions in Conflict
When various courts hold different views upon almost
identical cases, it is a bit hard for management or unions to
find out what is correct and what is illegal under various
:: ~circumstances. An Oregon Court held in the case of an "out-
side" union picketing employers, none of hose employees were
members of the picketing union, that there was no labor dispute. 2
Five years before, in 1936, in Oregon the same thing as found
to be a labor dispute.. 3 Many more such cases of circumstances
r? and different answers can be found. 4 With the many, many courts
that have jurisdiction over labor disputes handing down de-
cisions over a period of years, there is bound to be a confus-
ing end result. Once again, it may be argued that this is so
1. The variations between State and Federal legislation are
discussed in Smith and DeLancy, "The State Legislature .
and Unionismn '38 Mich. L. Rev., 987, 996-1023. "Labor
relations acts have been enacted in Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, MinnOsota, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Tis-
consin." (This was in 1940.) In ichigan and Minnesota
"trial by battle" is outlawed for a "cooling off" period
in which time state officials try to effect a conciliation.
:-'?~ l~ith the exception of the New York and Utah statutes, every
labor relations act contains employee restrictions. The
quantum of the restrictions in the state acts varies mark-
edly. These eployee restrictions are, generally speaking
aimed at specific types of misconduct, and do not purport
to authorize a flood of blanket injunctions.
2. Schwab v Moving Picture Machine Operators, etc. 165 Or. 602 1941
3. ?'allace Co. v International Assoc. of Mechanics, 155 Or. 652 1936
4. A list of divergent cases on the meaning of "labor Dispute"
can be found in Handler, . cit.
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in any type case that comes before a large number of different
courts; but in answer, does this make it right? Because other
parts of the law are confused, is that an argument for a con-
fused labor law?
It may also be argued that the National Labor Re-
lations Board has continuity in its decisions, that they' never
conflict. Even if this is so, it is unfortunate that only
certain tes of labor cases may come before the Beard; namely,
cases involving representation by unions and cases of alleged
unfair labor practices by the employer. (The Taft-Hartley Act
changes this picture a great deal. Now;$ the employer may bring
unfair labor practice charges against his employees.) Other
cases which are not within the purview of the 7agner Act must
be decided by the courts.
Supreme Court' s Role
In spite of Congress's intents, it appears very
much as if the future of any labor relations polidy lies in
the decisions of the Supreme Court. hat they may do next is
almost impossible to conjure; as already mentioned, the next
move may be away from the interstate commerce theory that per-
mits Congress to attempt a national labor relations policy.
When we see what the court has done in the vay of
assuming legislative preregatives in shaping a labor la?', it
is easily seen that Congress's position is a little uncertain--
quite a bit so. 7T1hy draft laws if the court is going to change
them around to its way of thinking; the Congress is supposed
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to have the- mandate of the people, not the courts. It would
seem that the Suprem.e Court is determined to have a large
share in shaping a national labor policy. The Apex Case1 and
the Hutcheson Case show just how the court is moving. 2 "By
a process of construction," dissents Justice Roberts in the
Hutcheson Case, "never, as I think, heretofore indulged by
this court, it is now found that, because Congress forbad the
issuing of injunctions to restrain certain conduct, it Intended3
to repeal rovisions of the Sherman Act. .... I venture to
say that no court has everimdertaken so radically to legis-
late where Congress has refused to do so."
Congressional leaders had thought that there was
no need to put a "safety clause" in the Sherman Act for the
protection of labor. They found out differently in 1908
/bury
when the Court decided the Dan Hatters' Case.y4 So Congress
in 1914 passed the Clayton Act which was to exempt labor
from the provisions of the Sherman Act. It washowever, as
Professor Gregory says "a boomerang, since the only thing it
accomplished was to permit private individuals to secure it-
~unctions under the Sherman Act."b The Congress soon found
1. Apex Hosiery Co. v Leader, 310 U.S. 469. Justice Stone
points out that the court never changes its mind even
though it may look that way.
2. U.S. v Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
3. Italics Added
4. Loewe v Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 "The Act provided that every
contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade
was illegal," said the court and thus fined the union
almost a uarter of a million dollars.
5. Social Change and Labor law. Sharp & Gregory, University
of Chicago Press, 1939, p 124.
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that the Clayton Act was so much wasted effort since in the
Duplex Casel the court's first opportunity to pass on the
Clayton Act--it indicated that as far as labor was concerned,
the Act merely recited what was already law and did not remove
labor from the application of the Sherman Act.
The end result was pressure that led up to the
passage in 1932 of the Norris-LaGuardia "Anti-Injunction"
Act. It was to free labor from the injunction in "labor
disputes." To make sure that courts unfriendly to labor
would not emasculate this Act as the Supreme Court dida
Section 20 of the Clayton Act by a narrow construction of
labor dispute; Congress went to considerable pains to define
"labor dispute" in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Yet some of
the lower Federal Courts including some circuit courts did
their best to undermine this statute by construing labor
disputes to be only between employers and those persons in
proximate relationship of employment;2 always it would seem
that the courts and Congress are in opposition.
Adherence to Precedent Dangerous
There is not much doubt that the law has as its
object a stable order; but if conditions and technoloy change
continually why not change the law to meet the changing con-
1. Duplex Printing Co. v Deering, 254 U. S. 443.
2. Again see Handler, op. cit., p 159, for a list of ,,hat
has, what has not been determined a "labor dispute."
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ditions? This should really be the job of our legislatures.
In proof of the fact that the public is no respecter of
traditional concepts and precedent, let's look at Judge
Parker's Case.
"The reaction against the ("Yellow-Dog") contract
culminated in the spring of 1930 in the rejection by the Senate
of the nomination of udge Parker to the United States Supreme
Court. Senator after senator attacked Parker for having en-
forced. the contract, but as a lower court judge it was Parker's
duty to follow the Supreme Court's decision in the Hitchman
Case. 7Then the Senate on ay 7, 1930, finally voted to
reject Parker, it was in reality passing judgement, not upon
him, but upon the Yellow-dog Contract."1
Once a legal principle has been applied the greatest
difficulty is experienced in changing it; courts do not rule
contrary to precedent. :udge Pound mentioned this in a case
in 1932--"Me would be departing from established precedents
if we upheld this inJunction"2--in further applying a doctrine
of law first enunciated in 1853.3
Is there any good reason for sticking to precedent
vhen times have outmoded that precedent? Because the
1. Seidman, The Yellow B Contract, John Hopkins Press.
1932, p3 4-3 6
2. Stillwell v Kaplan 259 N.Y. 405
3. Lurmley v Cye, 2 .&, B. 216
f.
5:
,I
i
::
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courts at times try to hold to precedents and at the same time
to meet new situations, great complexities in thought arise.l
Great Amounts of Time Involved in Litigations
Another factor which adds to the complexities exper-
ienced in labor litigations of today is the great amount of
time oftentimes necessary before the case is finally closed.
As a necessary corollary is the fact that a great deal of
money will be needed for legal fees, etc. The following
cases give in brief an idea of how long the proceedings some-
times are; Milk Wagon Drivers Union case,2 strikes in 1934--
final decision in 1941; Hitchman case,3 suit commenced in 1907--
Judgement in 1917; Apex case,4 sit down strike in 1937--court
decision in 1940; and so on.
Cases, as a rule, go through the NIRB much faster;
but, again, the NLIRB has jurisdiction over only certain cases.
!then, in many cases the issues are finally settled,
the cases themselves were all but forgotten in the minds of
the individual participants. Mr. irtz of the War Labor
Board recently said,5 "Generally court proceedings take two
years to finish suit and render judgement, by which time there
is a new collective bargaining agreement which wipes out the
1. The Coronado Coal Cases, for example. These are discussed
in Gregory, Labor and the Law, W.'Wl. Norton & Company, New
York, 1946, pp1-2F8. Itis shown how the court exercises
gymnastics to stay within a precedent and at the same time
tried to keep from applying it.
2. Milk Tragon Drivers Union v Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287
3. Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v Mitchell 245 U.S. 229
4. Duplex Hosiery Co. v Leader 310 U.S. 469
5 . Tn a sneech to the Harvard Lr School Forum, March 7, 1947
-
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disagreement .
True, the cases cited settled--or attempted to
settle--heretofore undecided matters of the law, and therefore
took time for careful rendering of decisions. It cannot be
said that the time was wasted;but neither can it be argued
that quicker and less costly decisions would not have brought
better results. There is ever present the danger that legal
proceedings may become fouled with red-tape. This must not be
permitted. Speedy decisions are to the best advantage of all
Just as are speedy resolutions of labor troubles.
This past section has been devoted to showing
how great, and unnecessary, conflicts exist in our labor law,
our national labor policy. The next section will attempt to
show wherein that policy is lacking and weak.
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II. Inadequacies in the Law
Parties to a Labor Disp
iiBi~ 'In a recent New York World Telegram cartoon by
D. E. Smith, organized labor dressed in overalls is seen
pulling at the arm of the labor leader, a cigar-smoking,
hulking bruiser who is crushing the life ot of poor ohn
Q. Public. The caption reads, "But, Boss' He's our Best
Friend:" This illustrates the forgotten man in the labor
dispute--the consumer.
Too often there is expressed, either directly or
otherwise, the idea that there' are but two parties to a labor
dispute--the employer and his employees. This idea is correct
in so far as it goes, but it stops woefully short of the mark.
Some people will add two more "interested Parties"__the govern-
ment and those who might be termed prospective employees.
Still others add another party--the public. Perhaps the best
way of arriving at a proper classification of the interests
in a labor dispute would be to examine a typical labor problem.1
Imagine, then,a case where a number of employees in
a large powrer company (which employs relatively few operational
employees') belong . to a union. Another union decides to or-
.~ ganize the remainder of the employees; even though aware of
the fact that the first union has been certified by the NLRB
.
i. Patterned after the recent public utility strike in Pitts-
burg, cited in Metz and Jacobstein, A National Labor Policy,
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 19-47, p45 
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as the bargaining agency for all employees. When it thinks
that it has sufficient strength this union demands that it be
named the bargaining agent and upon the company's refusal to
break its contract with the first union, calls a strike of
its men. This shuts the plant down with attendant shutdown
of power over all of the city and the stoppage of almost ail
light and power. No one is able to carry out normal business
activities and great hardships are visited upon the-ev-day -
affairs of all citizens. Management has been caught in a
seemingly insoluble dilemma and can appeal only to the govern-
ment for help.
Employer, employee, government, and public--the
consumers--are easily seen to be the parties effected in this
c..ase. Notice who it is that is the most effected--the con-
sIumer I - t was- taken as a basic premise in the Introduction
that the consumer is the most important of all parties involv-
ed. But the government hasn't thought so.
. ¢. Here there is a large area for argument that de-
pends upon different ideas of government. The stand taken here
is that the protection of the consumer is the most important
function of the: national labor relations policy. The consumer
has a hal time getting a new car, a new this or a new that,
because there Just aren't many on the market. hy? Well,
there is a parts shortage created by a strike in a supplier's
factory, etc., etc., ad nauseam. Our industrial scene is one
of ever more integration and constant intermeshings; all parts
!...!~
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are dependent to some decree upon another part or parts.
Trouble in one ear cog slows d.owmn the Twhole machine. flnd
the one person wvrho always loses--the consumer--wonders why;
so far it seems to be his task not to reason why, just do
and buy (if possible).
An obvious fact that seems to have escaoed detection
by a large maority of peoale, es:~eciZlly the apostles of
ever higher wages, it that without exception every single per-
son in this country is a consumer whether he belongs to the
NAJl or the CIO, the NINBE or the nlain voting citizenry with
no affiliations. The consumer is the keg iece in the Ii-
saw puzzle of our economy. '-ithout the market that hrle himself
is, the sokestacks of industry will cease to sout and the
production lines will come to a halt.
Incidence of Strikes
Over 16,000 ,000 man-days idle as results of strikes
in 1946: 1 just trile the amount of days lost in 1945 due to
strikes. The 1946 figures wrere called a"normal" reaction in
a postwar period by some. But other statistics belie this
contention. A year Awhich might be called "average," 194 1, had
over twenty-three million man-days idle;- and in the ar year,
1942, there .were still over four nd one-hs alf million idle man-
days,- as a result of strikes
I. ork toppaes Caused By Labor Yanaement isputes, 1946
TT.S. Bureau of abor Statistics, Ionthly Labor Review,Vool64,
:15 (1947) p.780
2.Ti.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 54 !bnthly Labor Review,
1107, 1125 (1942)
3. rii. 55=,m 255 (1942); 56 },/IR 292 (1943)
, ,1, ,' 
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It is significant that less than 10 per cent of
the strikes in 1942 were for recognition, whereas before the
Wagner Act, most of' the great strikes were for that purpose.
The bloody Homestead strike in 1892 and the Pullman strike
in '94 were essentially recognition strikes. The ~Wagner Act
has accomplished its purpose; "It is hereby declared the
public policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial. obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and. eliminate these obstructions when they
have been occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association. .. 
Only in so far as its expressed purposes has the
Wagner Act been successful. True, it has eliminated a great
deal of the obstruction of the free flow of commerce by caus-
ing a great cessation in bargaining and organizational strikes;
but i t~,also has helped create a monster--the jurisdictional.
strike, the closed shop fights, the sympathy strike, and
others have not been prevented nor have causes been eliminated.
The real intention of the authors of the agner Act was the
protection -of the worker's rights to organize and use unions
for bargaining. This has been accomplished, but it
has had little effect on settling the labor difficulties of
the country.
1. 29 USCA Section 151
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Functions of the National Labor Relations Board
Until August 22, 1947, the NUIRB had only two
functions; namely, to hear "C" cases (Complaints under Sec-
tion 8) and "R" cases (Representation cases). There was no
machinery for dealing with any other disputes that might
arise. That the functions of the Board under the W7agner Act
were thought inadequate is easily seen in the passage of the
recent Taft-Hartley Act. 7Whether the new powers of the Board
under this Act will successfully mitigate labor strife,
remains to be seen. A great many people think not, especially
in the face of the refusal of the CIO and AFL to deal with the
new Board.
Strikes Affecting the General Public
There has been no provision in the policy of the
Federal Government about strikes which are contrary to the
welfare of the general public. Only under special war-time
powers did the Federal Government feel safe to move against
John L. Lewis in the receht coal strike, and then what
victory there was seemed very hollow. There is no provision
in the 'Wagner Act or any other Act (with the exception of the
untried Taft-Hartley Act) for the protection of the public
from nationwide, crippling strikes, such as the recent tele-
phone strike. Political and economic pressure by certain
labor leaders and their direct dealings with the 7!hite House
have all but destroyed the prestige of government agencies.
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Unions have come to expect federal intervention
when an industry-wide strike affects the general public. In
fact, this has become a part of union strategy. Then there
is a complete stoppage of the production of a basic commodity,
the strike is in reality a strike against the general public,
including workers indirectly affected, quite as much as it is
a strike against the employers. In cases where the employer
is the United States Government, the strike or threat of
strike is directly, against the Government itself. This was
the situation in November 1946 in the coal industry.1
Whereas the government has no expressed powers other than
those given it temporar.ily in the war, there have been many
ra ' attempts at conciliation and settlement on the highest govern-
ment levels. In the settlement of economic problems, politi-
cal,expediency is likely to become the yardstick.2
Everyone is becoming aware that many strikes hit
the public directly. There is no need for extended examples
.. /
of how this can work; everyone is too familiar with the des-
parate situation occasioned by the coal strike of November, 1946.
It was taken as a basic premise that the general
public--the consumer--must be protected. At present there is
no articulate government policy'on the position of the con-
sumer. It would seem that the government leaders are swayed
by the political power of te union leaders.
1. Metz and Jacobstein, o cit., p.34
2. In October, lC46 present with J. L. Lewis and President
Truman's advisers in conference over the coal contract
was the chairman of the Democratic National Committee.
New York Times 10-30-46
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.It is evident that the free flow of commerce can be
seriously interrupted, even cut off, by labor activities over
which the government has no control.
The:-SheIman Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and
the Public Utilities Holding Comapny Act all were designed to
protect the. public from the monopolistic actions of large
scale management activities. As yet, there is no Act or
policy designed -to protect the public from the activities
of labor unions and management when engaged in industrial
warfare.
Part II has tried to show the inadequacies and the
complexities in the present picture of labor law. Part III
will attempt to iron them out by a program of legislation and
arbitration machinery.
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PART III
Resolving the conflicts in labor
law and setting up a system which
·will facilitate prompt solution
of labor strife.
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I. Objectives
Objectives
."We must always be aware that there is no logical
or ultimate solution. We are almost unable to define ex-
actly what social. principles could be used in developing a
logical answer. Our public leaders seem to have widely
divergent ideas; they seem to. be floundering in a sea of
inconsistencies, uncertain of the next turn, while the
participants of the struggle are still engaged in almost
primitive forms of trial by combat."l
It is to be noticed that only the poor points in
the labor law as it exists today have been brought forth.
This is not an attempt to completely discredit the good points.
The fact that unions and collective bargaining have been re-
cognized as necessary parts of the American scene show that
there has been an advance in the direction of a solution of
labor troubles. The main trouble is that the steps have
gone only so far and recognized but one side of a many-
faceted problem.
Any solution, in order to be worthy of the name
must be plausible and must also solve the problem at hand.
Needless to say, no matter how perfect in theory, if an answer
will not be acceptable to those people on whom the task of
1. Gregory, op cit., p 444
46
actual operations falls, it is no answer at all. The possibi-
lities presented here will be analyzed with this thought in
mind, and will also hold to three fundamental ideas.
1. -That labor unions and their legitimate ob-
jectives must not be emasculated is a primary idea, but that
restrictive labor practices are undesirable is also important.
2. That labor conflicts must not be extended to a
point where they will substantially injure innocent third
parties is taken as fundamental.
:- 3. That peaceful settlement of labor disputes must
be facilitated, and if needs be, at times enforced is also
fundamental.
That labor unions are desirable was discussed in
the Introduction and the need for their development was
shovmn in Part I. They have served the very useful function
of bringing about an improved ratio between prices and wages.
Yet even in 1942, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that
over 61 per cent of American families had an income which
could not maintain a level of "health and decency."1 There
is still a large field for valuable union activity.
To attain a higher standard of living, requires the
production of more goods and services for consumption at a
lower level of effort. But not infrequently the concerted
1. In 1942 given as- $2,060
* r;;:
j
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action of labor is utilized to restrict production,- fear of
- overproduction and unemployment being the cause for such
action. There is generally an antagonism to improved tech-
nology. In many instances unnecessary workers must be hired--
as in the Musicians Union and the railroad Brotherhoods;
painters outlaw the use of wide brushes and sprayguns, and the
UAW has stated at one time that it was their intention to
lower man-hour output.1 -
At present there is a great unfilled demand for
goods; there has been this same demand in the past; and yet
labor tries to justify these practices on the grounds of
possible overproduction. It is obvious that here we have a
case of conflict between the short-term interests of a very
few and the long-run interests of the whole community.
Even in the areas where there has been no legal
remedy for a wrong, force and violence have never been regard-
ed as a proper means of satisfaction. The area of private
warfare has always been limited by the considerations of
the possibilities of injuring an innocent party or the
general public. Yet in the labor picture such action is
permitted--the sympathy strike, the boycott, the urisdictional
strike cause harm to many persons standing on the sidelines.
1. TNEC Hearings, Vol. 30, p 16375
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It is held here that labor conflicts must not give sub-
stantial in jury to innocent third parties and that no small
group should have power to inconvenience the general public.
Work stoppages interfere with the productive pro-
cesses; they injure the general public in very varying degrees.
A small number of people in a small but necessary industry can
profoundly influence the comfort and even the safety of the
whole country. Because the general public has been drawn
into the labor scene as an unwilling participant, moves should
be taken to protect their interests. There is no reason why
capital and labor cannot bargain like sensible people instead
of resorting to trial by combat.
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II Resolving. the Conflicts
There are three possibilities of resolving the con-
flicts; two of hich are rejected as impractical.
First, there is the possibility that within a
short time there will no longer be any need for a labor law
since the parties will become "enlightened" and treat each
other as friendly rivals rather than as mortal enemies. This
would be the ideal solution; but, unfortunately, even a cur-
sory glance at the labor scene prevents one from adopting
this view, at least for the present and the immediate future.
A more practical suggestion is that which proposes
the formulation of a uniform state labor law much as has been
done with the law of sales, negotiable instruments, etc. If
this could be done, it would assuredly resolve the conflicts
arising from various state- statutes; but, getting forty-eight
legislatures.to agree on the same thing or even a reasonable
facimile would be a gargantuan task, especially when we can-
not get all of our national congressmen to agree. Even if we
were finally to see the day in which the various state legis-
lations were in agreement, the necessity for amending these
laws to meet the changing times would soon see different
states proceeding at different rates in changing their laws,
TheeL, too, there would still exist the difficulty
.with the federal legislation, since Congress seems determined
to play the major part in shaping the labor policy of the land.
These various objections doom this proposal.
Ir;
+!
r
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Proposition number three is perhaps the most inter-
esting and attainable. Since we cannot obtain complete accord
through state legislatures, and since the Congress is often
hamstrung in dealing with labor policy by the various limit-
ations imposed upon it, let us then delegate Congress complete
legislative authority for labor matters. This is a large
step and calls for an armendrent to the Constitution, and
w--ill be attacked fromlany sides. There will be cries defend-
ing "states rights;" there will be those that scream that
the Government is trying to take over all controls.
But a pause for consideration will convince m.any
people that times are different; that to meet new conditions
under a new technolorgy, we need new or, at least, revised
concepts to handle problems that have gotten out of hand under
the old systems. As Justice -trankfurter put it, "It is idle
to feel either blind resentment against goverment by com-
mission- or sterile longing for a golden past that never was.
Profound new forces call for new social inventions, or fresh
adantation of old experience. The great society T.th its
permeating influence of technology, large-scale industry, and
progressive urbanization, presses its problems; the history
of political and social liberty admonishes us of its lessons.
Nothing less is our task than fashioning instruments ahd pro-
cesses at once adequate for social needs and the protection of
individual freedom."1
1. Felix Frankfurter, Law and Politics, 1939, 234
-
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Eventually, if not in fact, at least in effect, there
will be such action taken as to amount to an amendment that
gives Congress power to formulate a labor policy for the
whole land--it- is now under the guise of regulating inter-
state commerce. But doing things by such round-about means,
inevitably, leads to confusion.
Congress, then, ought to be given the exclusive
authority for the formulation and regulation of a national
labor policy.
Our present-day society becomes more complex in all
of its aspects, necessitating the creation of many new types
of experts. The lawyer of fifty years ago- who tried contract,
will, criminal, equity, fraud, divorce, libel, and all other
sorts of cases Which came to his office, who appealed them to
'· / -~.the highest courts if necessary; who did all sorts of legal
drafting and personal work is no longer the dominating figure
of his profession. A few are found here and there who still
bear witness to the remarkable power and range of learning he
developed, but as the lawyer who gave the profession its
distinctive character during the last century, he belongs to
history.1 And is it not so with the judiciary as. with- the bar?
: .:hat ordinary judge can hope to keep abreast of all the types
of - cas-es that will come before him.? Surely he cannot give
each type the attention it deserves.
1. Dean Green of Northwestern University Law School in a
speech in February, 1936.
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This fact was recognized to some extent in the
creation of the National Labor Relations Board; a Board of
X. ~." three men, experts, ho were to administer the act. This figure
has been raised to five under the new labor relations act in
anticipation of the increased number of cases that will come
before the board.
No matter that the National Labor Relations Board
is termed an administrative body; its functions make it to all
'intents and purposes the equivalent of a United States District
Court. Appeal to a Circuit Court is the next step for any
party if dissatisfaction is felt whether vwith a ruling- of the
Board or a decision of a District Court.
., administering and. juding of law pertaining to labor. Article
III, Section 1 f the Constitution reads The judicial power
. '.> of the United States, shall be investemb in one sureoth-e Court,
1 ; udand in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time orSdain and establisho" Clearly there is no constitutional
bar to- such a move as this.
This would assure that (assuning proper. appointments)
the labor problems of the country would be at all times handled
by qualified experts, men educated in labor difficulties and
I_ ____I____·___n____Cl__i____ _____ _____
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able to devote their entire attention to the problems of
labor alone.
It has been said that the functions of the National
Labor Relations Board makes it a quasi-district court. This
imposes the ob of handling labor matters upon the circuit
courts when the uidns, management, or the board itself is
dissatisfied with one of the other parties' conduct. The
decision to by-pass the Circuit Court by establishing a
separate labor court to rank immediately beneath the Supreme
Court has been made partly upon the grounds of udicial in-
ability to handle such a wide variety of eases in a-anner which
will give sufficient attention to each. (As a matter of fact,
most cases which are taken to the circuit courts over the NLRB
reach the Supreme Court either in hearing or by denial of
certiorari.) If carried to an extreme, this argument could
lead to the position that not even the Supreme Court is
capable of handling the various cases that come under its
Jurisdiction. Here the defense rests upon a matter for
faith; faith that in the United States there will always be
nine men of great intelligence and legal ability and exper-
ience who can Judge any and all matters placed before them.
Very of-ten criticisms have been leveled at our court
system on the point that udges are generally appointed for
life and may, if they live long enough, hold antiquated .views
·'
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contrary to the large majority of public opinion. Thus the
New Deal in its early stages was faced with an antagonistic
court. To prevent extreme difficulties of this nature--where
Judges fail to develop with the times--it would be easy to
limit the time of appointment;appointments could be for ten
years, or more, or less.
Labor problems will be found to vary from district
to district; but under the present set-up all labor problems
are presumably decided in the same lights, by the NLRB in
washington,D.C. Surely the labor problems in rural states
such as Iowa are a great deal different from the problems in
an industrial state such as Pennsylvania. If there were
district labor courts, problems could be handled much more
effectively and quickly by judges acquainted with local condi-
tions. There will be a problem when it comes to apportioning
the United States into labor districts, but this ought not
to be so hrd. The various types of labor troubles are
generally functions of the type of industry; it is a fairly
straightforward problem to divide the United States into
industrial districts.
* * *
The Wagner Act stated that the usual rules of evidence
prevailing in the courts of law or equity shall not
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be eontnolling in hearings bfore the- Boarl. ' The Taft-
Har tley Act has pt these. ruees baek tnto: ef'fect. HoWdier. ,
there has been considerable modification .of the preceedings
in the Federal' Courts. Y...et'No unions, and ertainly no
individual, can now present a ease before the few National
Labor Relations Board without the assistance of an-attorney'.2
A small union--and there are many-- could not have-its' day in
court if it could not pt -for the services of an attorney...
This is a real danger. If we make our law so complex that it
stuffs the wheels and gears of otr machinery with so much saw-
dust, what has been gained?"3
Great care must be exercised to prevent' dangerous
over-complications. Yet the charge that the 'Services of a
lawyer are needed for a dqy in court, prove-s nothing more than
has already bee'n pointed out--that our society haes unavoidably
be comne cormplex. z
That happens if an emlployer or an e--oyee gr-up
co mmits what Congres-s has declated to be .an unfair labor
practice and the :injured party refuses to omplain 'but pre-
fers to fight, it out? Tder the present law the Board is Forced
to sit by and wat;ch the fracas. The framers and inter-
1. Section 10. (b)
2. For this reason the bill has been dubbed the "Lawyers'
Full Employment Bill."
3. C.J.Hagerty, Executive Secretaty of Calif., State Fed. of
Labor, in a speech on "Town Hall of the Air", July 10,1947
. '-
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preters of the Taft-Hartley Act are faced with ust that problem
today; the unions have as yet refused to follow the rules of
the general counsel of the new Board; they say they will
ignore the Board. Commerce may be interrupted, goods cease to
flow, and so forth, but the government is helpless to act.
Once again it is the consumer who takes the beating.
In a case where there is substantial interruptions
to the free flow of commerce and/or substantial injury to the
general public the Federal Government should be allowed to
take jurisdiction. In order to do this the Labor Court should
have a District Attorney who is able to prosecute those who
commit unfair labor practices, if the unfair labor practice
is causing trouble. This will be mentioned again later on.
.This so-called district attorney can also handle
"R" cases--cases of representation. It was earlier pointed
out that since someone other than the employees themselves
had a hand in the selection of bargaining units, that there
was not an absolutely free choice for the employees. The
boundaries of a bargaining unit could very often determine
the representatives thereof.' Here is a case -%here someone must
obviously take a hand, since the employees and management wuld
no doubt have trouble doing the Job themselves. It seems
that the government must do the choosing. This is somewhat
unfortunate, but necessary.
.Conferences between labor and management with the
"district attorney" as an arbitrator should be able to work
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out the bargaining question without a great deal of trouble.
There have been very few complaints about the NLIRB's handling
of "R" cases, and there is no reason to expect that this method
will be any less successful.
U
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Summary
Unfortunately the attainment of an enlightened
attitude between labor and capital remains a long way off.
Labor strife that injures any third parties must be minimized.
The best way to do this is to eliminate all complexities in the
law. Congress should be given the exclusive authority for
the form.ulation of a national labor policy. In place of the
NLRB a court system of expert udges should be set up and
coupled with a district attorney for prosecuting those guilty
of unfair labor practices.
The points in a national labor policy will be
considered in Part IV.
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PART IV
Specific recommendations for an
immediate legislation on a national
labor policy.
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RECOME:NDATIONS
Goals
Even though there be wide divergence in opinion
about the methods to be used, there exists an almost over-
whelming solidarity of views as to the basic aims and goals
of our modern society.1 It is this group of aims that might
perhaps be called the "American Way."
The goals which relate to the fomnmlation of labor
policy are; an ever-expanding national income, a progreqsvely
wider distribution of income, reduced effort in production,
reward based upon effort, full development of individual
capacities, rights of association, avoidance of violence, and
free speech.2 Most of these aims have been expanded elsewhere
in this paper; those that have not are so obvious that they
need no exposition.
To this is added the goal that is foremost in this
paper--the protection of the consumer interests by preventing
interruptions of the free flow of commerce.
The Strike
No strike must be allowed which will substantially
injure the general public. There will be a tendency on the
pert of those who are opposed to labor to construe this very
1. tz and Jacobstein, A National Labor Policy, Brookings I-
statute, Washington, 947
2. Ibid. Chapter IV
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broadly; they will try to show that almost every strike is
in effect against the general public. This danger will have to
be prevented by an. exact expression by Congress of what
constitutes a substantial injury. When there is a complete
or near complete stoppage of the production of a basic or
necessary commodity, the strike is in reality a strike against
the general public.
Any strike that is for the purpose of correcting
what Congress deems an unfair labor practice is completely
unnecessary since there already exists machinery for
correcting this practice--the labor court.
It is axiomatic that under our form of government
no person can be orced to work; he may be prevented from
working, but there is no way of making him work so long as he
is a private citizen. How can we keep people from striking
even for aeillegal object? By depriving them of the various
rights that have been given them by congressional action,
such as the right to reinstatement after a strike, the right
to appeal cases to the labor courts, etc. The Supreme Court
did Just this in the Fansteel Case. A group of employees
who went on a sit-down strike were refused re-instatement.
The court refused to uphold an NLRB order for their return to
work;l however, the Board has interpreted this to mean that
1. NLRB v Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. 306 U.S. 240 "Here
the strike was illegal in its inception and prosecution".
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the only crimianl acts which will prevent an employee from
being reinstated are felonies.
The anti-trust laws should be used to prevent the
consolidated use of the strike against two employers for the
purpose of limiting interstate commerce. Strikers should lose
E ,~'~ all protection of law when engaged in strikes to compel
the employer to break the law, or vitiate- his bargaining
agreements; they should not be allowed to strike eontrifry to
~~ .:7- the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Boycotts
This is a form of the sympathetic strike; both will
be dealt with here. It envolves the pressure uon a
person who, though linked by ommerce with some party to the
.dispute, has no dispute with the union. This is an entirely
unjustified action; it harms many innocent third parties.
The boycott and the sympathetic strike should be wiped from
the present picture for all time. The best way to do this
would be to allow an employer to discharge employees who
engage in this sort of activity.
Picketing
Either because of fear or custom or sometimes both
employees generally refuse to cross picket lines; this makes
picketing one of the major elements in industrial warfare
campaigns. The Supreme Court has held that there is an abso-
lute right to picket 1 on the basis that picketing was a
form of free speech.
t. Thornhill v Alabama 310 U.S. 88
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However, if the object of picketing is illegal, or if the
placards carried by pickets present untruths or misleading
statements, or if the picketing results in violence it should
be controlled to correct the abuse. People can be definitely
stopped from picketing whereas they could not be forced back
to work. To allow an employer to fire picketers is sometimes
of no avail; quite often the picketers are not employees.
The logical method to be used is the injunction. But, the
improper use of the injunction is still fresh in the minds
of organized labor and the very word to them is anathema.
Still, there is no danger involved in proper use of the
injunction. It should issue from the labor court after the
facts of the case have been speedily ascertained.
Collective Bargainring
The collective bargaining agreement is a most
important instrument; however, at the present time it is in
a weak position because it is unforceable. 1 There should be
,,-,.-,~P ... A.r,,,..4. 44- . -, n ,o..-..4 - A ..e,.,.- 4-P .of - ,~, ; .. 4A,.
fails to live up to its provisions. Bth the unions and
employers must be given the responsibilities inherent inI forming a contract; the collective bargaining agreement must
ii-
~
· be looked upon as a contract.
1. Wm nployees are not held by the NLRB to the conditions
set forth by such an agreement.
?,&.·.
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In order to help this along Congress should do the
following; define the subject matter of a collective bargaining
agreement that will be enforceable under law, provide that
unions, whether or not incorporated, are suable at law for
breach of contract, impose upon employees as well upon
employers the obligation to bargain collectively. The obligation
to bargain collectively must be adquately defined.
The means of enforcing the collective contract
is the same employed elsewhere when dealing with unions--
suspension of the bargaining rights of the unions in question.
These rights are not what may be called "absolute rights"; they
have been announced by Congress as public policy, but the
public policy can change if the welfare is threatened.
The bargaining agreement should be between employers
and their employees; not between industries and the entire
trade union. The smaller a bargaining unit, the less chance
there is for crippling strikes. It has been argued that only
through large industry-wide units are unions able to obtain
their obiectives. This is no longer so; the government has
and should continue to delineate the rights and legitimate aims
of employees. These aims should be protected by law, not by
fear of large-scale concerted action.
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Summary
A number of recommendations for Congressional
action have been made. These aims should be furthered under
whatever system the Congress decrees for the handling of
labor disputes, whether it be the present NLRB, the system of
l.or courts suggested, or some third alternative. These
recommendations have been made ith the.object of protecting
the general public by removing the causes and effects of
strikes and the like. The means used have not been violent;
violence cannot breed peace. Unions which are acting
contrary to the public policy are penalized by losing all
the rights that Congress and the courts have given to labor.
All rights that belong to labor should be described
from tiwme to 'time by the Congress in order tht there be no
confusion as to hat they are.
·av ctpUwt
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